Fair and consistent prize allocation in competitions by Dietzenbacher, Bas J. & Kondratev, Aleksei Y.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
08
98
5v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
0 A
ug
 20
20
FAIR AND CONSISTENT PRIZE ALLOCATION IN COMPETITIONS
BAS J. DIETZENBACHER AND ALEKSEI Y. KONDRATEV
Abstract. Given the final ranking of a competition, how should the total prize endowment
be allocated among the competitors? We study consistent prize allocation rules satisfying
elementary solidarity and fairness principles. In particular, we axiomatically characterize
two families of rules satisfying anonymity, order preservation, and endowment monotonicity,
which all fall between the Equal Division rule and the Winner-Takes-All rule. Specific
characterizations of rules and subfamilies are directly obtained.
Keywords : fair allocation, rank-order tournament, prize structure, tournament design, ax-
iomatic analysis, consistency
bdietzenbacher@hse.ru — National Research University Higher School of Economics, 16, Soyuza Pechatnikov
st., St. Petersburg, 190121, Russia — http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8023-0273
akondratev@hse.ru — corresponding author — National Research University Higher School of Economics,
16, Soyuza Pechatnikov st., St. Petersburg, 190121, Russia; Institute for Regional Economic Studies RAS,
38, Serpuhovskaya st., St. Petersburg, 190013, Russia — http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8424-8198
We are grateful to Victor Mironov (Karelian Research Center RAS, Petrozavodsk), Alexander Nesterov,
Egor Ianovski, Herve´ Moulin, and other colleagues from the International Laboratory of Game Theory and
Decision Making for helpful comments. Special thanks to William Thomson (University of Rochester) for
detailed comments and suggestions. We thank David Connolly (Higher School of Economics, Moscow) for
help with language editing.
1
1. Introduction
Innovation and crowdsourcing competitions, sales competitions in companies and sport-
ing events often take the form of rank-order tournaments (Kalra and Shi, 2001; Szymanski,
2003; Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; Archak and Sundararajan, 2009). Each such tournament is
held once, and the participants know the rules and the prize structure in advance. The
absolute result of a participant can be determined by, for example, the volume of sales in
a sales competition, the number of strokes in golf, or the time of elimination from a poker
tournament. However, a feature of the ranking format is that participants receive prizes
according to their relative results, while tournament organizers are free to choose the prize
structure.
Examples of prize structures are presented in Table 1. The PGA TOUR conducts many
regular golf tournaments with different prize endowments, but the same rules for distribut-
ing prizes. Table 1 shows examples of two such tournaments with a prize endowment of
$9.3 million and $6.6 million. The winner of the tournament receives 18% of the total prize
endowment, the runner-up 10.9%, and so on. WCOOP Poker Tournament has a comparable
prize endowment but follows a different prize-money distribution. What exactly are the sim-
ilarities and differences of various prize structures? What general principles can tournament
organizers follow when choosing a prize structure?
Table 1. Examples of single rank-order tournaments
WCOOP 2019 Main Event Poker Tournament
Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Top 10 Endow.
Main 1,666 1,188 847 603 430 307 219 156 111 79 5,605 11,180
Share 14.9 10.6 7.57 5.40 3.85 2.74 1.96 1.39 0.99 0.71 50.1 100
PGA TOUR 2019/20 Golf Tournaments
Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Top 10 Endow.
Genesis 1,674 1,014 642 456 381 337 314 291 272 253 5,633 9,300
Safeway 1,188 719 455 323 271 239 223 206 193 180 3,998 6,600
Share 18.0 10.9 6.9 4.9 4.1 3.63 3.38 3.13 2.93 2.73 60.6 100
Notes : the prize endowment, the total prize for top 10 positions, and the prize for each position from 1 to
10 are given in thousands of dollars. The shares are given in percentages of the total prize endowment.
This paper examines prize structures in terms of fairness principles. Since the basic prin-
ciples of justice must be universal and clear, they must also be found in particular examples
of tournaments and competitions. Consistent with the principle of anonymity, is that the
participants’ rewards depend only on their position in the competition. That is, when the
organizers award a prize for a position regardless of which participant takes that position.
According to the principle of order preservation, a higher position does not correspond to a
lower reward. This creates the right incentives for participants, as the efforts made during
preparation for and participation in the tournament help the competitor to end up higher
3in the final ranking and receive a more valuable reward. Thirdly, endowment monotonicity
is satisfied when an increase in the total prize fund does not decrease the reward for each
position. This creates uniform incentives for all participants, as both leaders and outsiders
are interested in increasing the total prize endowment of the tournament.
To distribute prizes, the organizers need to know three things: the list of the participants,
the results of the competition, and the size of the prize endowment. For each such triple,
the prize allocation rule used should uniquely distribute the prize endowment among the
participants. We call a rule for the distribution of prizes ‘fair’ if it satisfies the principles of
anonymity, order preservation, and endowment monotonicity. Anonymity and order preser-
vation are standard principles for single rank-order tournaments; see the literature overview
in subsection 1.1. Endowment monotonicity is a standard principle in fair allocation liter-
ature; see Moulin (2003). These three principles of justice are so undemanding that even
together they do not exclude any visible class of prize structures. Therefore, we are free to
add another principle.
The universal principle of consistency is often applied in fair allocation problems (Balinski and Young,
1982; Thomson, 2012). We apply this principle to the prize allocation problem as follows.
Suppose that the participants have some ranking in a competition and receive the corre-
sponding prizes. Then some participants leave with their prizes. The remaining participants
decide to redistribute the remaining prize endowment, taking into account the modified com-
position of the participants. The rule is consistent if such a redistribution does not change
the amount the remaining participants receive.
Although consistency with respect to single rank-order tournaments looks demanding, it is
often observed in reality. For example, the Equal Division (ED) rule and the Winner-Takes-
All (WTA) rule are consistent. As a more complex example, suppose that in a competition
with 100 participants, the company awards a number of fixed-size cash prizes of $2,000. The
limited prize endowment provides a certain number of equal prizes to the participants with
the highest positions, and any remaining balance goes to the next participant. So, if the
prize fund is $6,000, then the three best participants A, B, and C win $2,000 each. If the
fund grows to $11,000, then the top five participants A, B, C, D, and E win $2,000 each, and
the participant in sixth position, F wins $1,000. Consistency requires that if the organizer
has already transferred payments to participants B, C, and F, then re-applying the rule to
the competition without participants B, C, and F and with $6,000 prize endowment will
leave everything as before: participants A, D, and E receive $2,000 each, since they are the
best among the remaining participants.
What do the fair and consistent prize distribution rules look like? The Equal Division
rule, the Winner-Takes-All rule, and the aforementioned rule illustrate the main feature of
such rules. Our first main result shows that all fair and consistent rules are some combination
4of these three rules (Theorem 1). Since this is still a large family, we can strengthen our
requirements for its properties.
In particular, we can strengthen order preservation. We say that the rule satisfies strict
order preservation if prizes for positions from the first to the last form a strictly decreasing
sequence. There are no fair and consistent rules for the distribution of prizes that satisfy
strict order preservation. On the other hand, the Winner-Takes-All rule is the only fair and
consistent rule in which the prize for the first position always exceeds the prize for the last
position (Corollary 1).
We can also strengthen endowment monotonicity. To do this, we examined three more
stringent properties. The first strengthening of endowment monotonicity is winner strict
endowment monotonicity. This property additionally requires that with an increase in the
prize endowment, the prize for the first position strictly increases. This leads to the following
one-parameter family. Each rule from this family sets a maximum size of an individual prize,
which all competitors receive equally regardless of their position, while all the excess goes
to the winner (Corollary 2(i)). Therefore, we call this a Winner-Takes-Surplus (WTS) rule.
For example, the size of a laboratory’s premium fund is often recognized only at the end
of the year. The head of the laboratory with 10 employees can consider a fair premium of
$2,000. Then, with a fund size of $10,000, each employee receives $1,000. But if the size of
the fund is $24,000, then the best worker gets $6,000, and each of the others receives $2,000.
The second strengthening of endowment monotonicity is strict endowment monotonicity.
This property requires that with an increase in the prize endowment, the prize for each
position strictly increases. The Equal Division rule is the only fair and consistent rule that
satisfies strict endowment monotonicity (Corollary 2(ii)).
The third strengthening of endowment monotonicity is also suggested by the examples
from Table 1. The prize structures from golf and poker are proportional, that is, when the
prize fund is increased k times, the prize for each position also increases k times. We show
that the only two fair, consistent, and proportional rules for the distribution of prizes are
the Equal Division rule and the Winner-Takes-All rule (Corollary 3). As a result, we see
that the prize structures from poker and golf are not consistent.
Since consistency can be an excessive requirement, we further formulate a weaker principle
of local consistency.1 Imagine that a tournament is held among participants of different skill
levels. The organizer could distribute the prize fund according to the general ranking of all
participants; or the organizer could divide the prize fund into two parts and distribute the
prizes separately among the participants of high and low levels. If both methods lead to the
same distribution of prizes, then the rule is locally consistent. For example, Table 1 shows
the top 10 poker tournament participants receive a total of $5.605 million of a total prize
1We were inspired by local stability introduced by Young (1988).
5endowment of $11.18 million. Local consistency requires that if you apply the rule separately
to the top 10 participants and a prize endowment of $5.605 million, then they will receive
the same prizes.
Our second main result describes the class of fair and locally consistent rules that satisfy
winner strict endowment monotonicity. Each such rule is generated by some continuous and
non-decreasing function f as follows. The winner of the competition receives some prize,
x, the runner-up receives a prize f(x), the third position receives a prize f(f(x)), and so
on. The value of x is unambiguously determined from the condition that the organizer
distributes the whole prize endowment (Theorem 2, Corollary 4). This class contains, for
instance, arithmetic type of prize allocation rules (Example 6 in Section 3). Further, we
show that the prize structure is fair, locally consistent and proportional, iff the prizes form
a geometric sequence with parameter λ, that is, the prize for position r + 1 is the fraction
λ of the prize for position r (Corollary 5). For example, the prizes in the final stage of the
poker tournament from Table 1 form a geometric sequence with λ = 0.713 and, therefore,
are locally consistent. The prizes in golf tournaments, however, do not form a geometric
sequence and, therefore, are not locally consistent.
Our results are presented in Table 2. Note that no prize allocation rule satisfies all 10
properties considered. However, the geometric rules with a parameter λ such that 0 < λ < 1
satisfy all properties except for consistency.
The paper is structured as follows. The next subsection reviews the literature. Section 2
introduces the model and characterizes fair and consistent prize allocation rules. Section 3
characterizes fair and locally consistent prize allocation rules. Section 4 concludes. The
proofs are contained in the Appendix.
1.1. Literature overview. In this brief literature overview, we highlight other papers re-
lated to our key topics: fairness, consistency, rank-order tournaments, prize allocation, and
axiomatic characterization.
Francis Galton (1902) was the first to ask how the total prize money should be divided into
prizes for each ranking position in a rank-order tournament. Using a probabilistic approach
with order statistics, Galton concluded that when only two prizes are given, the first prize
should approximately be three times the value of the second.
The seminal paper of Lazear and Rosen (1981) analyzed rank-order tournaments from
an economic perspective. In their model, a firm assigns a certain prize to each ranking
position. Then each worker chooses a level of effort which leads to an output. The rela-
tive ranking of the outputs determines the prizes for workers. Lazear and Rosen found the
optimal prize structure that maximizes the worker’s utility in equilibrium. The subsequent
literature proposed similar models and studied optimal prize structures that maximize differ-
ent goals, such as the total output (Glazer and Hassin, 1988), the revenue to the auctioneer
6Table 2. Properties of prize allocation rules
Winner- Winner- Fair and
Fair and Takes- Takes- Equal WTA Locally
Consistent All Surplus Division and Consistent Geometric
Rules (WTA) (WTS) (ED) ED Rules Rules
Th. 1 Cor. 1 Cor. 2(i) Cor. 2(ii) Cor. 3 Th. 2 Cor. 5
Cor. 4
ak, bk, one a ∈ [0,∞] one two function f : λ ∈ [0, 1]
k=1, 2, . . . rule rule rules 0≤f(x)≤x
Anonymity + + + + + +* +*
Order Pres. +* + +* +* +* +* +*
Win.-Los. St. only +* only − only f(x) < x all but
Ord. Pres. WTA WTA WTA for x > 0 ED
Strict − − − − − 0<f(x)<x all but
Order Pres. for x > 0 WTA,ED
End. Mon. +* +* + + + + +
Win. Strict only + +* + + +* +
End. Mon. WTS
Strict only − only +* only f is all but
End. Mon. ED ED ED increasing WTA
Propor. only + only + +* only +*
(End. Add.) WTA,ED WTA,ED Geometric
Loc. Cons. + + + + + +* +*
Consistency +* +* +* +* +* only only
WTS WTA,ED
Notes :
• + indicates that the property is satisfied by each rule in the family, − indicates that the property
is not satisfied by each rule in the family, and * indicates the axiomatic characterizations;
• the Winner-Takes-All rule (WTA) fits Theorem 1 with a1 = 0, b1 = ∞, Corollary 2 with a = 0,
Theorem 2 with f(x) = 0 for x ≥ 0, and Corollary 5 with λ = 0;
• the Equal Division rule (ED) fits Theorem 1 with ak = bk = 0 for all k, Corollary 2 with a = ∞,
Theorem 2 with f(x) = x for x ≥ 0, and Corollary 5 with λ = 1;
• a Winner-Takes-Surplus rule (WTS) with parameter a fits Theorem 1 with a1 = a and b1 =∞, and
Theorem 2 with f(x) = min{a, x} for x ≥ 0;
• a geometric rule with parameter λ fits Theorem 2 with f(x) = λx for x ≥ 0.
(Barut and Kovenock, 1998), the total effort of competitors (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), the
highest effort among all competitors (Moldovanu and Sela, 2006), the weighted total effort
of the top k competitors (Archak and Sundararajan, 2009), the participation of competitors
(Azmat and Mo¨ller, 2009), and the participation of talented competitors (Azmat and Mo¨ller,
2018).
In the literature on rank-order tournaments, anonymity and order preservation are stan-
dard fairness properties for prize allocation rules. In the model of Lazear and Rosen (1981),
a firm assigns a certain prize to each position regardless of the identity of the worker who
occupies the position. O’Keeffe et al. (1984) studied anonymous prize allocation, which
7they call ‘fair’, and compared it with non-anonymous prize allocation, which they call ‘un-
fair’. Glazer and Hassin (1988), Barut and Kovenock (1998), Moldovanu and Sela (2001),
Moldovanu and Sela (2006), and Azmat and Mo¨ller (2009) considered the order preserva-
tion of prizes as a model assumption. Archak and Sundararajan (2009) call order preserving
prizes ‘fair’. Olszewski and Siegel (2020) found that total effort maximization, concave prize
valuations, and convex effort costs call for the strict order preservation of prizes.
The Winner-Takes-Surplus (WTS) and geometric prize sequences that we axiomatically
characterize appeared in the literature for other reasons. Moldovanu et al. (2007) introduced
contests for status and found that when the total prize money is high enough, the WTS prize
sequence maximizes the total effort of competitors. Gershkov et al. (2009) showed that under
some assumptions the WTS prize sequence is an efficient redistribution of output among
partners within teams. Newman and Tafkov (2014) provided an experiment and showed
that relative performance information has a negative effect on performance of competitors
if the WTS prize sequence is used. Xiao (2016) studied geometric prize sequences because
under some assumptions it guarantees the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium,
which is hard to prove for general prize sequences.
The consistency principle for allocation rules was motivated by Balinski and Young (1982)
as “every part of a fair division should be fair”. Later, Thomson (2012) argued that this should
be restated as “every part of every socially desirable allocation should be socially desirable”.
Consistency has been applied in several models for allocation problems with infinitely divis-
ible goods. Moulin (1985) characterized equal cost allocation rules using consistency under
the name ‘separability’. Inspired by the Talmud, consistency was applied to bankruptcy
problems (Aumann and Maschler, 1985), taxation problems (Young, 1987), and rationing
problems (Moulin, 2000). Under the name ‘stability’, Lensberg (1987) studied the implica-
tions of consistency in the context of bargaining problems, in particular for the Nash solution
(Lensberg, 1988). Thomson (1988) used consistency to characterize the Walrasian correspon-
dence for exchange economies. The core and the Shapley value for cooperative games were
characterized in terms of consistency by Peleg (1986) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), re-
spectively. Thomson (1994) showed that the central uniform rule for allocation problems with
single-peaked preferences admits a characterization based on consistency. Consistent solu-
tions in atomless economies were analyzed by Thomson and Zhou (1993). Recently, Oso´rio
(2017) employed consistency for operational problems and obtained a geometric structure
for resource allocation.
The literature on prize allocation in competitions has not taken an axiomatic approach
and the fair allocation literature has not focused on competitions. We connect these two
fields by applying the axiomatic approach to prize allocation in competitions. Surprisingly,
the literature on this topic is scarce. A rare example is Petro´czy and Csato´ (2019), who
8proposed a parametric rule based on pairwise comparisons. However, they did not provide
axiomatic characterizations. The axiomatic literature on broadcasting revenue sharing is
also scarce. Recently, Bergantin˜os and Moreno-Ternero (2020) axiomatically characterized
two such sharing rules.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first that develops and motivates prize allocation rules
for competitions directly from axioms.
2. Consistent prize allocation rules
2.1. Model. Let U be a countable set of at least three potential competitors. On each given
occasion, a finite subset N ⊆ U is in a competition. This competition results in a ranking,
a bijection R : N → {1, . . . , |N |} assigning to each competitor a position. Here, competitor
i ∈ N has a higher position in the ranking than competitor j ∈ N if R(i) < R(j). The prize
endowment E ∈ R+ is the amount of prize money to be allocated among the competitors.
Thus, a competition is a triple (N,R, E).
Assuming that more money is better for each competitor, the preferences of the com-
petitors over the feasible prize allocations are in conflict. In order to select a reasonable
compromise for each competition, we study prize allocation rules ϕ which assign to each
competition (N,R, E) an allocation of the prize endowment among the competitors, i.e.
ϕ(N,R, E) ∈ RN+ is such that ∑
i∈N
ϕi(N,R, E) = E.
Throughout this paper, ϕ denotes a generic prize allocation rule.
Reflecting the opposing principles of egalitarianism and elitism, two extreme and basic
prize allocation rules are the Equal Division rule and the Winner-Takes-All rule. The ED
rule divides the prize money equally among the competitors, i.e. it assigns to each competition
(N,R, E) the prize allocation
EDi(N,R, E) =
E
|N |
for each i ∈ N .
The WTA rule allocates all the prize money to the competitor with the highest position, i.e.
it assigns to each competition (N,R, E) the prize allocation
WTAi(N,R, E) =

E if R(i) = 1;0 otherwise.
The ED rule is fair from an egalitarian perspective since it treats each competitor equally;
the WTA rule is fair from an elitist perspective since it rewards the winner for achieving the
highest position in the ranking.
9We take an axiomatic approach to study the fundamental differences between prize allo-
cation rules. This means that we formulate some desirable properties of rules and analyze
their implications. An elementary property imposing a form of equal treatment of competi-
tors is anonymity, which requires that the prize allocation does not depend on the identities
of the competitors, but only on the number of competitors, their ranking, and the prize
endowment.
Anonymity
For each pair of competitions (N,R, E) and (N ′,R′, E) with equal numbers of competitors
|N | = |N ′|, and each pair of competitors i ∈ N and j ∈ N ′ with equal positionsR(i) = R′(j),
we have
ϕi(N,R, E) = ϕj(N
′,R′, E).
The fairness property imposing the prize allocation to reflect the ranking is order preserva-
tion, which requires that the prize of a competitor is not lower than the prize of a competitor
with a lower position in the ranking.
Order preservation
For each competition (N,R, E), if competitor i ∈ N has a higher position in the ranking R
than competitor j ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) ≥ ϕj(N,R, E).
The solidarity property endowment monotonicity requires that no competitor is worse off
when the prize endowment increases.
Endowment monotonicity
For each pair of competitions (N,R, E) and (N,R, E ′) with E < E ′ and each competitor
i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) ≤ ϕi(N,R, E
′).
Endowment monotonicity is a stronger property than endowment continuity, which requires
that small changes in the prize endowment have a small impact on the assigned prize allo-
cation.
Endowment continuity
For each pair of competitions (N,R, E) and (N,R, E ′), we have ϕ(N,R, E)→ ϕ(N,R, E ′)
if E → E ′.
Lemma 1
If a prize allocation rule satisfies endowment monotonicity, then the rule satisfies endowment
continuity.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
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2.2. Joint characterization. Prize allocation may depend on the number of competitors.
A criterion for evaluating whether a prize allocation rule prescribes coherent allocations
for competitions with different numbers of competitors is consistency. Consider an ar-
bitrary competition (N,R, E) and suppose that some competitors S ⊆ N redistribute
their accumulated prizes. This redistribution is based on their subranking, the bijection
RS : S → {1, . . . , |S|} such that for each pair of competitors i ∈ S and j ∈ S, we have
RS(i) < RS(j) iff R(i) < R(j). A prize allocation rule is consistent if it allocates to each
competitor i ∈ S in the corresponding reduced competition the same prize as in the original
competition.
Consistency
For each competition (N,R, E), each nonempty subset of competitors S ⊆ N , and each
competitor i ∈ S, we have2
ϕi(N,R, E) = ϕi
(
S,RS,
∑
j∈S
ϕj(N,R, E)
)
.
The Equal Division rule and the Winner-Takes-All rule both satisfy anonymity, order
preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consistency, but these rules are not the only
ones. The following example provides another rule satisfying these properties.
Example 1
Let a prize allocation rule be defined by allocating the prize endowment in the following way.
Up to the first dollar is allocated to the competitor with the highest position, the surplus up
to the second dollar is allocated to the competitor with the second highest position, and so
on until each competitor has been allocated one dollar. If there is still money left, the first
additional dollar is allocated to the competitor with the highest position, the second addi-
tional dollar to the competitor with the second highest position, and so on. This procedure
continues until the full prize endowment is allocated among the competitors. This rule also
satisfies anonymity, order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consistency. △
It turns out that anonymity is implied by order preservation, endowment monotonicity,
and consistency. This is captured by the following lemma.
Lemma 2
If a prize allocation rule satisfies order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consis-
tency, then the rule satisfies anonymity.
To have a full understanding of the joint implication of order preservation, endowment
monotonicity, and consistency, we only need to focus on the structure of the corresponding
2In fact, all results in this section hold when consistency is weakened to bilateral consistency, requiring
consistency only for reduced competitions with two competitors.
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prize allocation rules for competitions with two competitors. The following lemma shows
that each such rule has at most one consistent extension.3
Lemma 3
If two prize allocation rules satisfying endowment monotonicity and consistency coincide for
each competition with two competitors, then the two rules coincide for each competition with
an arbitrary number of competitors.
How do prize allocation rules satisfying order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and
consistency look for competitions with two competitors? To this end, it helps to graph-
ically illustrate possible prize allocation paths, i.e. draw the prize allocations assigned to
competitions with two competitors when the prize endowment increases from zero.
Example 2
Let (N,R, E) with |N | = 2 be a competition with two competitors. Denote N = {1, 2} such
that R(1) = 1 and R(2) = 2. Let the prize endowment E gradually increase from zero.
Then the prize allocation paths of the ED rule, the WTA rule, and the prize allocation rule
ϕ from Example 1 are illustrated as follows.
ϕ10 1 2 3 4
ϕ2
1
2
3
4
ED(N,R, E)
WTA(N,R, E)
ϕ(N,R, E)
The horizontal axis depicts the prize allocated to competitor one and the vertical axis depicts
the prize allocated to competitor two. The dotted lines indicate different levels of the prize
endowment. △
Each prize allocation rule satisfying order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and
consistency is somehow a combination of the ED rule, the WTA rule, and the type of rule
in Examples 1 and 2. Each such prize allocation rule can be described in the following way.
Let N ⊆ U be a finite set of competitors and consider a corresponding ranking and prize
endowment. Then there exist disjoint intervals (ak, bk) with ak ∈ R+ and bk ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞}
for each k such that the following holds. Each competitor is allocated a prize of ak when
the prize endowment equals |N |ak. If the endowment is higher, first the prize allocated
3A similar result in the context of claims problems was obtained by Aumann and Maschler (1985).
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to the competitor with the highest position is increased to bk, then the prize allocated to
the competitor with the second highest position is increased to bk, and so on. This means
that each competitor is allocated a prize of bk when the prize endowment equals |N |bk. If
the average prize endowment does not belong to one of these intervals, it is equally divided
among the competitors. The formal description of all these prize allocation rules is captured
by the following theorem.
Theorem 1
A prize allocation rule ϕ satisfies order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consis-
tency iff there exist disjoint intervals (a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . with a1, a2, . . . ∈ R+ and b1, b2, . . . ∈
R+ ∪ {+∞} such that for each competition (N,R, E) and each competitor i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) =


ak if |N |ak ≤ E ≤ (|N | − R(i) + 1)ak + (R(i)− 1)bk;
x if (|N | − R(i) + 1)ak + (R(i)− 1)bk ≤ E ≤ (|N | − R(i))ak +R(i)bk;
bk if (|N | − R(i))ak +R(i)bk ≤ E ≤ |N |bk;
E
|N |
otherwise,
where x = E − (|N | − R(i))ak − (R(i)− 1)bk.
Example 3
The ED rule fits Theorem 1 by setting ak = bk = 0 for each k. The WTA rule fits Theorem 1
by setting a1 = 0 and b1 = +∞. The prize allocation rule from Examples 1 and 2 fits
Theorem 1 by setting ak = k − 1 and bk = k for each k.
Let (N,R, E) with |N | = 2 be a competition with two competitors. Denote N = {1, 2}
such that R(1) = 1 and R(2) = 2. The prize allocation path of the rule ϕ satisfying order
preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consistency which fits Theorem 1 with a1 = 1,
b1 = a2 = 2
1
2
, b2 = 3, a3 = 3
1
2
, and b3 = +∞ is illustrated as follows.
ϕ10 1 2 3 4
ϕ2
1
2
3
4 ϕ(N,R, E)
△
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2.3. Strengthening the properties. Theorem 1 shows that many rules satisfy order preser-
vation, endowment monotonicity, and consistency. This means that there is room for im-
posing additional requirements. In particular, it may be possible to strengthen one of the
properties. Unfortunately, order preservation, which requires that the prize of a competitor
is not lower than the prize of a competitor with a lower position, cannot be strengthened
to strict order preservation, which requires that the prize of a competitor is higher than
the prize of a competitor with a lower position. However, it can be strengthened to the
weaker property winner-loser strict order preservation, which requires in addition to order
preservation that the prize of the competitor with the highest position is higher than the
prize of the competitor with the lowest position. Only the Winner-Takes-All rule satisfies
winner-loser strict order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consistency.
Strict order preservation
For each competition (N,R, E) with E > 0, if competitor i ∈ N has a higher position in the
ranking R than competitor j ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) > ϕj(N,R, E).
Winner-loser strict order preservation
For each competition (N,R, E) with E > 0, if competitor i ∈ N has a higher position in the
ranking R than competitor j ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) ≥ ϕj(N,R, E)
and if R(i) = 1 and R(j) = |N |, then
ϕi(N,R, E) > ϕj(N,R, E).
Corollary 1
(i) The Winner-Takes-All rule is the unique prize allocation rule satisfying winner-loser
strict order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consistency.
(ii) No prize allocation rule satisfies strict order preservation, endowment monotonicity,
and consistency.
Instead of strengthening order preservation, it is also possible to strengthen endowment
monotonicity, which requires that no competitor is worse off when the prize endowment
increases. For instance, strict endowment monotonicity requires that each competitor is
better off when the prize endowment increases, or the weaker property winner strict en-
dowment monotonicity requires in addition to endowment monotonicity that the winner is
better off when the prize endowment increases. Only the Equal Division rule satisfies order
preservation, strict endowment monotonicity, and consistency. A prize allocation rule sat-
isfies order preservation, winner strict endowment monotonicity, and consistency iff it is a
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Winner-Takes-Surplus rule, i.e. it coincides with the ED rule up to some value of the prize
endowment, and it allocates the surplus according to the WTA rule.
Strict endowment monotonicity
For each pair of competitions (N,R, E) and (N,R, E ′) with E < E ′ and each competitor
i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) < ϕi(N,R, E
′).
Winner strict endowment monotonicity
For each pair of competitions (N,R, E) and (N,R, E ′) with E < E ′ and each competitor
i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) ≤ ϕi(N,R, E
′)
and if R(i) = 1, then
ϕi(N,R, E) < ϕi(N,R, E
′).
Corollary 2
(i) A prize allocation rule ϕ satisfies order preservation, winner strict endowment mono-
tonicity, and consistency iff ϕ is a Winner-Takes-Surplus rule, i.e. there exists a ∈
R+ ∪ {+∞} such that for each competitor i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) =


E − (|N | − 1)a if E ≥ |N |a and R(i) = 1;
a if E ≥ |N |a and R(i) 6= 1;
E
|N |
otherwise.
(ii) The Equal Division rule is the unique prize allocation rule satisfying order preservation,
strict endowment monotonicity, and consistency.
Example 4
The ED rule fits Corollary 2(i) by setting a = +∞. The WTA rule fits Corollary 2(i) by
setting a = 0. The prize allocation path of a Winner-Takes-Surplus rule ϕ can be illustrated
as follows.
ϕ10 a
ϕ2
a
ϕ(N,R, E)
△
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Alternatively, endowment monotonicity can be strengthened to endowment additivity.
Suppose that the prize endowment turns out to be higher than expected. Then there are two
ways of proceeding. Either the initial allocation is cancelled and the rule is applied to the
competition with the new prize endowment, or the rule is applied to the competition with
the increment as the prize endowment and the resulting allocation is added to the initial
allocation. A prize allocation rule satisfies endowment additivity if both ways of proceeding
lead to the same prize allocation. Endowment additivity is equivalent to proportionality,
which requires that each position in the ranking of a competition is assigned a fixed pro-
portion of the prize endowment. Even when the prize endowment is not known in advance,
the competitors know which share corresponds to each position. Among all prize allocation
rules satisfying order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consistency, only the ED
rule and the WTA rule satisfy endowment additivity.
Endowment additivity
For each pair of competitions (N,R, E) and (N,R, E ′) and each competitor i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E + E
′) = ϕi(N,R, E) + ϕi(N,R, E
′).
Proportionality
For each competition (N,R, E) and each competitor i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) = Eϕi(N,R, 1).
Lemma 4
A prize allocation rule satisfies endowment additivity iff the rule satisfies proportionality.
Corollary 3
The Equal Division rule and the Winner-Takes-All rule are the only two prize allocation
rules satisfying order preservation, endowment additivity (proportionality), and consistency.
3. Locally consistent prize allocation rules
We know that the Equal Division rule and the Winner-Takes-All rule are two members
of a family of prize allocation rules satisfying anonymity, order preservation, endowment
monotonicity, and consistency. Strengthening order preservation or endowment monotonicity
leads to impossibilities, uniqueness, or restricted families. However, consistency may be
considered too strong a requirement, since an arbitrary subranking may not reflect the results
of the original competition well. Suppose for instance that two competitors of a competition
with a large number of competitors reevaluate their allocated prizes on the basis of their
subranking. Then the reduced competition tends to lose significant features of original
competition, e.g. it does not take into account whether the two competitors originally ended
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up with the highest position and the second highest position, or with the highest position
and the lowest position.
In fact, it may be desirable to weaken consistency to local consistency, which requires only
consistent allocations for reduced competitions where for each of two competitors, each other
competitor with an intermediate position is also involved. In other words, local consistency
requires invariance under splitting up the full competition into leagues, where the competitors
in the top segment of the ranking are put in a separate league, the competitors in the second
segment of the ranking are put in a second league, and so on.
Local consistency
For each competition (N,R, E), each subset of competitors S ⊆ N such that |R(i)−R(j)| ≤
|S| − 1 for each of two competitors i ∈ S and j ∈ S, and each competitor i ∈ S, we have4
ϕi(N,R, E) = ϕi
(
S,RS,
∑
j∈S
ϕj(N,R, E)
)
.
In contrast to consistency, the following example shows that a prize allocation rule satisfy-
ing order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and local consistency does not necessarily
satisfy anonymity.
Example 5
Let i ∈ U and j ∈ U be two potential competitors. Let the prize allocation rule ϕ be defined
in the following way. If i has the highest position and j has the second highest position in the
ranking, then ϕ divides the prize endowment equally among competitors i and j. Otherwise,
ϕ divides the prize endowment according to the WTA rule. Formally, ϕ assigns to each
competition (N,R, E) the prize allocation such that if i, j ∈ N , R(i) = 1, and R(j) = 2,
then
ϕk(N,R, E) =


1
2
E if k ∈ {i, j};
0 otherwise,
and otherwise
ϕk(N,R, E) =

E if R(k) = 1;0 otherwise.
Then ϕ satisfies order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and local consistency, but does
not satisfy anonymity. By Lemma 2, ϕ does not satisfy consistency. △
Needless to say, all the prize allocation rules described in Theorem 1 satisfy anonymity,
order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and local consistency, but these rules are not
the only ones. The following example provides another rule satisfying these properties.
4In fact, all results in this section hold when local consistency is weakened to bilateral local consistency,
requiring local consistency only for reduced competitions with two competitors.
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Example 6
Let a prize allocation rule be defined by allocating the prize endowment in the following way.
Up to the first dollar is allocated to the competitor with the highest position. The surplus is
divided equally among the competitors with the highest position and the competitor with the
second highest position until they are allocated two and one dollar, respectively, or until the
prize endowment is exhausted. Then the surplus is divided equally among the competitors
with the three highest positions until they are allocated three, two, and one dollar, respec-
tively. This procedure continues until the competitor with the lowest position is allocated
one dollar. If there is still money left, this is equally divided among the competitors. This
prize allocation rule also satisfies anonymity, order preservation, endowment monotonicity,
and local consistency.
Let (N,R, E) with |N | = 2 be a competition with two competitors. Denote N = {1, 2}
such that R(1) = 1 and R(2) = 2. Then the prize allocation paths of the ED rule, the WTA
rule, and the prize allocation rule ϕ described above are illustrated as follows.
ϕ10 1 2 3 4
ϕ2
1
2
3
4
ED(N,R, E)
WTA(N,R, E)
ϕ(N,R, E)
△
Note that the arithmetic type of rule in Example 6 satisfies winner strict endowment mono-
tonicity, i.e. the competitor with the highest position is better off when the prize endowment
increases. Each prize allocation rule satisfying anonymity, order preservation, winner strict
endowment monotonicity, and local consistency admits a compact indirect description. For
each such rule there exists a continuous and non-decreasing function f : R+ → R+ with
0 ≤ f(x) ≤ x for each x such that the assigned allocation for each competition can be
described in the following way. The competitor with the highest position is allocated a prize
of x ∈ R+. The competitor with the second highest position is allocated a prize of f(x).
The competitor with the third highest position is allocated a prize of f(f(x)), and so on. In
total, the full prize endowment is allocated among the competitors. The formal description
of all these prize allocation rules is captured by the following theorem.
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Theorem 2
A prize allocation rule ϕ satisfies anonymity, order preservation, winner strict endowment
monotonicity, and local consistency iff there exists a continuous and non-decreasing function
f : R+ → R+ with 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ x for each x such that for each competition (N,R, E) and
each competitor i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) =

x if R(i) = 1;f (R(i)−1)(x) otherwise,
where x ∈ R+ is such that x+
∑|N |
k=2 f
(k−1)(x) = E. (Here, we denote f (k)(x) = f(f (k−1)(x)).)
Example 7
The ED rule fits Theorem 2 by setting f(x) = x for each x. The WTA rule fits Theorem 2
by setting f(x) = 0 for each x. The arithmetic type of rule from Example 6 fits Theorem 2
by setting
f(x) =

0 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1;x− 1 if x ≥ 1.
△
Theorem 2 does not hold for all prize allocation rules satisfying anonymity, order preser-
vation, endowment monotonicity, and local consistency. If such rule does not satisfy winner
strict endowment monotonicity, the prize of the competitor with the second highest position
cannot be expressed as a function of the prize of the competitor with the highest position.
Moreover, as the following example shows, such a rule for competitions with two competitors
does not necessarily have a unique locally consistent extension to competitions with more
competitors.
Example 8
Let a prize allocation rule be defined by allocating the prize endowment in the following
way. Up to the first dollar is allocated to the competitor with the highest position. Sub-
sequently, one dollar is allocated to the competitor with the second highest position and
then another dollar is allocated to the competitor with the highest position. Thereafter, one
dollar is allocated to the competitor with the third highest position, then another dollar to
the competitor with the second highest position, and then another dollar to the competitor
with the highest position. This procedure continues until the competitor with the highest
position is allocated an amount of dollars equal to the number of competitors. If there is still
money left, first another dollar is allocated to the competitor with the lowest position, then
another dollar to the competitor with the second lowest position, and so on. This continues
until the full prize endowment is allocated among the competitors. This prize allocation rule
satisfies anonymity, order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and local consistency, but
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does not satisfy winner strict endowment monotonicity. Moreover, for competitions with two
competitors, this rule coincides with the prize allocation rule from Examples 1 and 2. △
Theorem 2 shows that there are many other rules satisfying anonymity, order preservation,
winner strict endowment monotonicity, and local consistency. Subfamilies are obtained if
order preservation is strengthened to strict order preservation or winner-loser strict order
preservation, or winner strict endowment monotonicity is strengthened to strict endowment
monotonicity. For each prize allocation rule satisfying anonymity, order preservation, winner
strict endowment monotonicity, and local consistency, the rule satisfies winner-loser strict
order preservation iff it does not coincide with the ED rule for each positive prize endowment,
and the rule satisfies strict order preservation iff it does not coincide with the ED rule nor
with the WTA rule for each positive prize endowment. Moreover, a prize allocation rule
satisfying anonymity, order preservation, winner strict endowment monotonicity, and local
consistency satisfies strict endowment monotonicity iff it does not allocate any additional
prize endowment according to the WTA rule.
Corollary 4
Let ϕ be a prize allocation rule satisfying anonymity, order preservation, winner strict en-
dowment monotonicity, and local consistency. Let f : R+ → R+ with 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ x for each
x be a continuous and non-decreasing function such that for each competition (N,R, E) and
each competitor i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) =

x if R(i) = 1;f (R(i)−1)(x) otherwise,
where x ∈ R+ is such that x+
∑|N |
k=2 f
(k−1)(x) = E. Then the following statements hold.
(i) ϕ satisfies winner-loser strict order preservation iff 0 ≤ f(x) < x for each x > 0;
(ii) ϕ satisfies strict order preservation iff 0 < f(x) < x for each x > 0;
(iii) ϕ satisfies strict endowment monotonicity iff f is increasing.
If winner strict endowment monotonicity is strengthened to endowment additivity (pro-
portionality), then an interesting family of geometric prize allocation rules is obtained. For
each rule satisfying anonymity, order preservation, endowment additivity, and local consis-
tency, there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that the assigned allocation for each competition can be
described in the following way. The competitor with the second highest position is allocated
a prize of λ times the prize of the competitor with the highest position. The competitor with
the third highest position is allocated a prize of λ times the prize of the competitor with the
second highest position, i.e. λ2 times the prize of the competitor with the highest position.
The competitor with the fourth highest position is allocated a prize of λ3 times the prize
of the competitor with the highest position, and so on. In total, the full prize endowment
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is allocated. The formal description of all these prize allocation rules is captured by the
following corollary.
Corollary 5
A prize allocation rule ϕ satisfies anonymity, order preservation, endowment additivity (pro-
portionality), and local consistency iff ϕ is a geometric prize allocation rule, i.e. there exists
λ ∈ [0, 1] such that for each competition (N,R, E) and each competitor i ∈ N , we have5
ϕi(N,R, E) =
λR(i)−1∑|N |−1
k=0 λ
k
E.
Example 9
The ED rule fits Corollary 5 with λ = 1. The WTA rule fits Corollary 5 with λ = 0. The
prize allocation paths of the ED rule, the WTA rule, and the geometric prize allocation rule
ϕ with λ = 1
2
can be illustrated as follows.
ϕ10 1 2 3 4
ϕ2
1
2
3
4
ED(N,R, E)
WTA(N,R, E)
ϕ(N,R, E)
△
4. Concluding remarks
This paper takes an axiomatic approach to study fair and consistent prize allocation in
single rank-order competitions. We introduce a model in which the competitors, their final
ranking, and the prize endowment are the primitives and we characterize two families of
prize allocation rules. In the next remark, we formally state that the axioms are logically
independent.
Remark Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are each based on a set of logically independent prop-
erties. To see this, consider the following prize allocation rules. The rule which allocates all
the prize money to the competitor with the lowest position satisfies endowment monotonicity
and consistency, but does not satisfy order preservation. The rule which coincides with the
Equal Division rule for competitions with a prize endowment of, at most, one dollar, and
5Here, we define λ0 = 1 for each λ ∈ [0, 1].
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coincides with the Winner-Takes-All rule for competitions with a higher prize endowment,
satisfies order preservation and consistency, but does not satisfy endowment monotonicity.
The rule from Example 5 satisfies order preservation, winner strict endowment monotonicity,
and local consistency, but does not satisfy anonymity and consistency. The geometric prize
allocation rule that fits Corollary 5 with λ = 2 satisfies anonymity, winner strict endowment
monotonicity, and local consistency, but does not satisfy order preservation. The rule from
Examples 1 and 2 satisfies anonymity, order preservation, and local consistency, but does not
satisfy winner strict endowment monotonicity. The rule which coincides with the ED rule
for competitions with two competitors and coincides with the WTA rule for competitions
with more than two competitors satisfies anonymity, order preservation, and winner strict
endowment monotonicity, but does not satisfy local consistency.
The practical relevance of our paper is that if an organizer wants to choose a prize alloca-
tion rule and accepts some set of axioms, then the problem is reduced to choosing a single
rule from the corresponding family. Since the families are broad enough, the organizer can
choose the rule that maximizes some desirable goal, such as the total effort of competitors or
the participation of talented competitors. This problem could be studied in future research
using an optimization approach.
Our axiomatic framework can be further developed in many directions. For single rank-
order tournaments, a natural direction is the study of other desirable axioms. In situations
where more data is available, we can take more details into account for prize allocations.
One possibility is to replace the ordinal ranking in our model by a cardinal ranking, e.g.,
using finish times, scores, or the volume of sales. Another possibility is to consider other
competition types, such as knockout tournaments, round-robin tournaments, and multiple
rank-order tournaments.
Multiple rank-order tournaments, consisting of a series of single rank-order tournaments,
are interesting for the following reasons. In many real series, a competitor gets a prize and
a number of points in each single tournament. Then the total sum of points determines the
total ranking and the bonuses for the entire series. A straightforward question is how to
jointly choose a points system, a prize structure for each single tournament, and a bonus
structure for the entire series. In particular, since Corollary 5 calls for geometric prize
sequences and Kondratev et al. (2019) justify geometric point sequences, should we choose
the same parameter for both geometric sequences?
Another open question is how to apply for competitions the rules developed for ranking,
voting, or budget allocation. For instance, Kreweras (1965) and Fishburn (1984) developed
a probabilistic voting rule known as maximal lotteries. Brandl et al. (2016) noted that
‘the lotteries returned by probabilistic social choice functions do not necessarily have to be
interpreted as probability distributions. They can, for instance, also be seen as fractional
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allocations of divisible objects such as time shares or monetary budgets.’ Airiau et al. (2019)
argued that ‘the maximal lotteries rule, while attractive according to consistency axioms,
spends the entire budget on the Condorcet winner if it exists. This is often undesirable
in a budgeting context.’ We can conclude from these arguments that any application of
well-known ranking, voting, or allocation rules must be re-motivated and re-justified in the
context of competitions.
Appendix
Lemma 1
If a prize allocation rule satisfies endowment monotonicity, then the rule satisfies endowment
continuity.
Proof. Let ϕ be a prize allocation rule satisfying endowment monotonicity. Let (N,R, E)
and (N,R, E ′) be two competitions. Let i ∈ N . By endowment monotonicity,
|E −E ′| = |
∑
j∈N
ϕj(N,R, E)−
∑
j∈N
ϕj(N,R, E
′)|
= |
∑
j∈N
(ϕj(N,R, E)− ϕj(N,R, E
′))|
=
∑
j∈N
|ϕj(N,R, E)− ϕj(N,R, E
′)|
≥ |ϕi(N,R, E)− ϕi(N,R, E
′)|.
This means that ϕi(N,R, E) → ϕi(N,R, E
′) if E → E ′. Hence, ϕ satisfies endowment
continuity. 
Lemma 2
If a prize allocation rule satisfies order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consis-
tency, then the rule satisfies anonymity.
Proof. Let ϕ be a prize allocation rule satisfying order preservation, endowment monotonic-
ity, and consistency. By Lemma 1, ϕ satisfies endowment continuity.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ϕ does not satisfy anonymity. Then there exist
two competitions (N,R, E) and (N ′,R′, E) with equal numbers of competitors |N | = |N ′|,
and two competitors i1 ∈ N and j1 ∈ N
′ with equal positions R(i1) = R
′(j1) such that
ϕi1(N,R, E) < ϕj1(N
′,R′, E). Since∑
k∈N
ϕk(N,R, E) = E =
∑
k∈N ′
ϕk(N
′,R′, E),
there exist two competitors i2 ∈ N and j2 ∈ N
′ with equal position R(i2) = R
′(j2) such that
ϕi2(N,R, E) > ϕj2(N
′,R′, E). Suppose without loss of generality that R′(j1) = R(i1) <
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R(i2) = R
′(j2). Denote x = ϕ(N,R, E) and y = ϕ(N
′,R′, E). By consistency,
(xi1 , xi2) = ϕ({i1, i2},R{i1,i2}, xi1 + xi2)
and
(yj1, yj2) = ϕ({j1, j2},R
′
{j1,j2}
, yj1 + yj2).
This is illustrated in the following way.
(1)
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
i2 2 xi2
N R ϕ
j1 1 yj1
j2 2 yj2
By order preservation, yj2 < xi2 ≤ xi1 < yj1. One of the following six cases hold.
Case 1 i1 = j2 and i2 = j1
By (1),
N R ϕ
i1 = j2 1 xi1
i2 = j1 2 xi2
N R ϕ
j1 1 yj1
j2 2 yj2
Then there exists another competitor k ∈ U \ {i1, i2}. By order preservation, endowment
continuity, and consistency, there exist prize endowments E ′ and E ′′ such that
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
i2 2 xi2
k 3 E ′ − xi1 − xi2
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
k 2 E ′′ − xi1 − xi2
i2 3 xi2
By order preservation, E ′ − xi1 − xi2 ≤ xi2 ≤ E
′′ − xi1 − xi2 . By consistency,
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
k 2 E ′ − xi1 − xi2
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
k 2 E ′′ − xi1 − xi2
By endowment monotonicity,
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
k 2 xi2
By order preservation, endowment continuity, consistency, and (1), there exist prize endow-
ments E ′′′ and E ′′′′ such that
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
i2 2 E
′′′ − xi1 − xi2
k 3 xi2
N R ϕ
j1 1 yj1
j2 2 yj2
k 3 E ′′′′ − yj1 − yj2
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By order preservation, E ′′′ − xi1 − xi2 ≤ xi1 and E
′′′′ − yj1 − yj2 ≤ yj2. By consistency,
N R ϕ
i2 1 E
′′′ − xi1 − xi2
k 2 xi2
N R ϕ
i2 = j1 1 yj1
k 2 E ′′′′ − yj1 − yj2
Then E ′′′−xi1−xi2 ≤ xi1 < yj1 and xi2 > yj2 ≥ E
′′′′−yj1−yj2. This contradicts endowment
monotonicity.
Case 2 i1 = j2 and i2 6= j1
By order preservation, endowment continuity, consistency, and (1), there exists prize endow-
ment E ′ such that
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
j1 2 E
′ − xi1 − xi2
i2 3 xi2
By order preservation, E ′ − xi1 − xi2 ≥ xi2 . By consistency,
N R ϕ
i1 = j2 1 xi1
j1 2 E
′ − xi1 − xi2
Then xi1 < yj1 and E
′ − xi1 − xi2 ≥ xi2 > yj2. By (1), a contradiction follows from Case 1.
Case 3 i1 6= j2 and i2 = j1
By order preservation, endowment continuity, consistency, and (1), there exists a prize en-
dowment E ′ such that
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
j2 2 E
′ − xi1 − xi2
i2 3 xi2
By order preservation, E ′ − xi1 − xi2 ≤ xi1 . By consistency,
N R ϕ
j2 1 E
′ − xi1 − xi2
i2 = j1 2 xi2
Then E ′ − xi1 − xi2 ≤ xi1 < yj1 and xi2 > yj2. By (1), a contradiction follows from Case 1.
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Case 4 i1 = j1 and i2 6= j2
By order preservation, endowment continuity, consistency, and (1), there exists a prize en-
dowment E ′ such that
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
j2 2 E
′ − xi1 − xi2
i2 3 xi2
By order preservation, E ′ − xi1 − xi2 ≥ xi2 . By consistency,
N R ϕ
i1 = j1 1 xi1
j2 2 E
′ − xi1 − xi2
Then xi1 < yj1 and E
′ − xi1 − xi2 ≥ xi2 > yj2. By (1), this contradicts endowment mono-
tonicity.
Case 5 i1 6= j1 and i2 = j2
By order preservation, endowment continuity, consistency, and (1), there exists a prize en-
dowment E ′ such that
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
j1 2 E
′ − xi1 − xi2
i2 3 xi2
By order preservation, E ′ − xi1 − xi2 ≤ xi1 . By consistency,
N R ϕ
j1 1 E
′ − xi1 − xi2
i2 = j2 2 xi2
Then E ′ − xi1 − xi2 ≤ xi1 < yj1 and xi2 > yj2. By (1), this contradicts endowment mono-
tonicity.
Case 6 i1 6= j1 6= i2 and i1 6= j2 6= i2
By order preservation, endowment continuity, consistency, and (1), there exist zj1 and zj2
such that
N R ϕ
i1 1 xi1
j1 2 zj1
j2 3 zj2
i2 4 xi2
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By order preservation, zj1 ≤ xi1 and zj2 ≥ xi2 . By consistency,
N R ϕ
j1 1 zj1
j2 2 zj2
Then zj1 ≤ xi1 < yj1 and zj2 ≥ xi2 > yj2. By (1), this contradicts endowment monotonicity.

Lemma 3
If two prize allocation rules satisfying endowment monotonicity and consistency coincide for
each competition with two competitors, then the two rules coincide for each competition with
an arbitrary number of competitors.
Proof. Let ϕ and ϕ′ be two prize allocation rules satisfying endowment monotonicity and
consistency such that ϕ(N,R, E) = ϕ′(N,R, E) for each competition with two competitors.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a competition (N,R, E) such that
ϕ(N,R, E) 6= ϕ′(N,R, E). Since∑
i∈N
ϕi(N,R, E) = E =
∑
i∈N
ϕ′i(N,R, E),
there exist two competitors i ∈ N and j ∈ N such that
(2) ϕi(N,R, E) < ϕ
′
i(N,R, E) and ϕj(N,R, E) > ϕ
′
j(N,R, E).
By consistency,
(ϕi(N,R, E), ϕj(N,R, E)) = ϕ({i, j},R{i,j}, ϕi(N,R, E) + ϕj(N,R, E))
and
(ϕ′i(N,R, E), ϕ
′
j(N,R, E)) = ϕ
′({i, j},R{i,j}, ϕ
′
i(N,R, E) + ϕ
′
j(N,R, E))
= ϕ({i, j},R{i,j}, ϕ
′
i(N,R, E) + ϕ
′
j(N,R, E)).
By endowment monotonicity,
ϕi(N,R, E) ≤ ϕ
′
i(N,R, E) and ϕj(N,R, E) ≤ ϕ
′
j(N,R, E),
or
ϕi(N,R, E) ≥ ϕ
′
i(N,R, E) and ϕj(N,R, E) ≥ ϕ
′
j(N,R, E).
This contradicts (2). Hence, ϕ(N,R, E) = ϕ′(N,R, E) for each competition (N,R, E). 
Theorem 1
A prize allocation rule ϕ satisfies order preservation, endowment monotonicity, and consis-
tency iff there exist disjoint intervals (a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . with a1, a2, . . . ∈ R+ and b1, b2, . . . ∈
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R+ ∪ {+∞} such that for each competition (N,R, E) and each competitor i ∈ N ,
ϕi(N,R, E) =


ak if |N |ak ≤ E ≤ (|N | − R(i) + 1)ak + (R(i)− 1)bk;
x if (|N | − R(i) + 1)ak + (R(i)− 1)bk ≤ E ≤ (|N | − R(i))ak +R(i)bk;
bk if (|N | − R(i))ak +R(i)bk ≤ E ≤ |N |bk;
E
|N |
otherwise,
where x = E − (|N | − R(i))ak − (R(i)− 1)bk.
Proof. It is readily checked that each such ϕ satisfies order preservation, endowment mono-
tonicity, and consistency.
Let ϕ be a prize allocation rule satisfying order preservation, endowment monotonicity,
and consistency. By Lemma 1, ϕ satisfies endowment continuity. By Lemma 2, ϕ satisfies
anonymity. By Lemma 3, we only need to show that ϕ satisfies the description for each
competition with two competitors, since each such rule has a unique consistent extension to
competitions with more competitors. Let N ⊆ U with |N | = 2 be two competitors and let
R be a ranking. Denote N = {1, 2} such that R(1) = 1 and R(2) = 2. The proof consists
of two steps.
Step 1. For each prize endowment E, if E = x1 + x2 such that
(3) ϕ(N,R, x1 + x2) = (x1, x2),
then
(4) ϕ(N,R, x1 + x1) = (x1, x1) or ϕ(N,R, x2 + x2) = (x2, x2).
Proof of Step 1. Let E be a prize endowment and denote ϕ(N,R, E) = (x1, x2). Then
E = x1 + x2 and (3) holds. By order preservation, x1 ≥ x2. If x1 = x2, then (4) follows
immediately from (3).
Suppose that x1 > x2. LetN
′ = {1, 2, 3} and letR′ be a ranking ofN ′ such thatR′(1) = 1,
R′(2) = 2, and R′(3) = 3. By order preservation and endowment continuity, there exists
a prize endowment E ′ such that ϕ1(N
′,R′, E ′) + ϕ3(N
′,R′, E ′) = x1 + x2. By anonymity,
consistency, and (3),
(5) ϕ(N ′,R′, E ′) = (x1, E
′ − x1 − x2, x2).
By order preservation, x1 + x2 + x2 ≤ E
′ ≤ x1 + x1 + x2. By anonymity and consistency,
ϕ(N,R, E ′ − x1) = (E
′ − x1 − x2, x2)(6)
and ϕ(N,R, E ′ − x2) = (x1, E
′ − x1 − x2).(7)
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If E ′ = x1 + x2 + x2, then (4) follows immediately from (6). If E
′ = x1 + x1 + x2, then (4)
follows immediately from (7).
Suppose that x1 + x2 + x2 < E
′ < x1 + x1 + x2. Then E
′ − x1 < x1 + x2 < E
′ − x2. By
endowment monotonicity, (3), (6), and (7),
(8) ϕ(N,R, E ′′) =

(E
′′ − x2, x2) if E
′ − x1 ≤ E
′′ ≤ x1 + x2;
(x1, E
′′ − x1) if x1 + x2 ≤ E
′′ ≤ E ′ − x2.
Denote (y1, y2, y3) = ϕ(N
′,R′, x1 + x2 + x2) and (z1, z2, z3) = ϕ(N
′,R′, x1 + x1 + x2). By
endowment monotonicity and (5),
y1 ≤ x1 ≤ z1,
y2 ≤ E
′−x1 − x2 ≤ z2,
y3 ≤ x2 ≤ z3.
Then y1+ y2 ≤ E
′−x2 and E
′−x1 ≤ z2+ z3. Since y3 ≤ x2 and y1+ y2+ y3 = x1+x2 +x2,
we have x1 + x2 ≤ x1+ x2 + x2− y3 = y1+ y2. Since x1 ≤ z1 and z1 + z2 + z3 = x1 +x1 + x2,
we have z2 + z3 = x1 + x1 + x2 − z1 ≤ x1 + x2. This means that
x1 + x2 ≤ y1 + y2 ≤ E
′ − x2,
and E ′ − x1 ≤ z2 + z3 ≤ x1 + x2.
By anonymity, consistency, and (8),
ϕ1(N,R, y1 + y3) = y1 = ϕ1(N,R, y1 + y2) = x1,
and ϕ2(N,R, z1 + z3) = z3 = ϕ2(N,R, z2 + z3) = x2.
Since y1 ≤ z1 and y3 ≤ z3, we have y1+y3 ≤ z1+z3. By endowment monotonicity and (8), for
each E ′′ such that ϕ1(N,R, E
′′) ≥ x1, we have E
′′ ≥ x1 + x2. Since ϕ1(N,R, y1 + y3) = x1,
we have y1 + y3 ≥ x1 + x2. By endowment monotonicity and (8), for each E
′′ such that
ϕ2(N,R, E
′′) ≤ x2, we have E
′′ ≤ x1 + x2. Since ϕ2(N,R, z1 + z3) = x2, we have z1 + z3 ≤
x1 + x2. Hence,
x1 + x2 ≤ y1 + y3 ≤ z1 + z3 ≤ x1 + x2.
Then y1 + y3 = x1 + x2 and z1 + z3 = x1 + x2. Since y1 = x1 and z3 = x2, we have y3 = x2
and z1 = x1. This means that y = (x1, x2, x2) and z = (x1, x1, x2). By anonymity and
consistency, ϕ(N,R, x1 + x1) = (x1, x1) and ϕ(N,R, x2 + x2) = (x2, x2). Hence, (4) holds.
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Step 2. There exist disjoint intervals (a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . with a1, a2, . . . ∈ R+ and b1, b2, . . . ∈
R+ ∪ {+∞} such that
(9) ϕ(N,R, E) =


(E − ak, ak) if ak + ak ≤ E ≤ bk + ak;
(bk, E − bk) if bk + ak ≤ E ≤ bk + bk;
E
2
otherwise.
Proof of Step 2. If ϕ1(N,R, E) = ϕ2(N,R, E) for each prize endowment E, then (9) follows
immediately by defining ak = bk = 0 for each k.
Let E be a prize endowment with ϕ1(N,R, E) > ϕ2(N,R, E). Denote ϕ(N,R, E) =
(x1, x2). Then E = x1 + x2, x1 > x2, and
ϕ(N,R, x1 + x2) = (x1, x2).
By Step 1, ϕ(N,R, x1 + x1) = (x1, x1) or ϕ(N,R, x2 + x2) = (x2, x2).
Suppose that ϕ(N,R, x1 + x1) = (x1, x1). Define
(10)
bE = x1
and aE = min
E′∈R+
{ϕ2(N,R, E
′) | ϕ1(N,R, E
′) = bE}.
Then aE < bE since aE ≤ x2 < x1 = bE . Moreover, ϕ(N,R, bE + aE) = (bE , aE) and
ϕ(N,R, bE + bE) = (bE , bE). By endowment monotonicity,
(11) ϕ(N,R, E ′) = (bE , E
′ − bE) if bE + aE ≤ E
′ ≤ bE + bE .
This also means that
(12) bE + aE < E
′ < bE + bE if aE < ϕ2(N,R, E
′) < bE .
Let E ′ be a prize endowment with aE + aE < E
′ < bE + aE. Denote (y1, y2) = ϕ(N,R, E
′).
By endowment monotonicity and (10), y1 < bE and y2 ≤ aE . Then aE < y1 since aE ≤
aE+aE−y2 < E
′−y2 = y1. By Step 1, ϕ(N,R, y1+y1) = (y1, y1) or ϕ(N,R, y2+y2) = (y2, y2).
If ϕ(N,R, y1+ y1) = (y1, y1), then aE < y1 = ϕ2(N,R, y1+ y1) < bE , (12) implies bE + aE <
y1 + y1 < bE + bE and (11) implies y1 = ϕ1(N,R, y1 + y1) = bE , which is a contradiction.
This means that ϕ(N,R, ϕ2(N,R, E
′) + ϕ2(N,R, E
′)) = (ϕ2(N,R, E
′), ϕ2(N,R, E
′)) for
each prize endowment E ′ with aE + aE < E
′ < bE + aE . Since ϕ2(N,R, bE + aE) = aE , we
have ϕ(N,R, aE + aE) = (aE, aE) by endowment continuity. By endowment monotonicity,
ϕ(N,R, E ′) = (E ′ − aE , aE) if aE + aE ≤ E
′ ≤ bE + aE .
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Suppose that ϕ(N,R, x2 + x2) = (x2, x2). Define
(13)
aE = x2
and bE = sup
E′∈R+
{ϕ1(N,R, E
′) | ϕ2(N,R, E
′) = aE}.
Then aE < bE since aE = x2 < x1 ≤ bE . Moreover, ϕ(N,R, aE + aE) = (aE, aE) and
ϕ(N,R, bE + aE) = (bE , aE). By endowment monotonicity,
(14) ϕ(N,R, E ′) = (E ′ − aE, aE) if aE + aE ≤ E
′ ≤ bE + aE .
This also means that
(15) aE + aE < E
′ < bE + aE if aE < ϕ1(N,R, E
′) < bE .
Let E ′ be a prize endowment with bE+aE < E
′ < bE+bE . Denote (y1, y2) = ϕ(N,R, E
′). By
endowment monotonicity and (13), bE ≤ y1 and aE < y2. Then y2 < bE since y2 = E
′− y1 <
bE + bE − y1 ≤ bE . By Step 1, ϕ(N,R, y1 + y1) = (y1, y1) or ϕ(N,R, y2 + y2) = (y2, y2). If
ϕ(N,R, y2 + y2) = (y2, y2), then aE < y2 = ϕ1(N,R, y2 + y2) < bE , (15) implies aE + aE <
y2 + y2 < bE + aE and (14) implies y2 = ϕ2(N,R, y2 + y2) = aE, which is a contradiction.
This means that ϕ(N,R, ϕ1(N,R, E
′) + ϕ1(N,R, E
′)) = (ϕ1(N,R, E
′), ϕ1(N,R, E
′)) for
each prize endowment E ′ with bE + aE < E
′ < bE + bE . Since ϕ1(N,R, bE + aE) = bE , we
have ϕ(N,R, bE + bE) = (bE , bE) by endowment continuity. By endowment monotonicity,
ϕ(N,R, E ′) = (bE , E
′ − aE) if bE + aE ≤ E
′ ≤ bE + bE .
The set of intervals {(aE , bE) : ϕ1(N,R, E) > ϕ2(N,R, E)} is countable because the
intervals are disjoint and we can construct a one-to-one correspondence between each interval
and a rational number from the interval. Hence, (9) holds.
By anonymity, (9) holds for each competition with two competitors. By Lemma 3, the
description in Theorem 1 is the unique consistent extension of (9) to competitions with more
competitors. 
Lemma 4
A prize allocation rule satisfies endowment additivity iff the rule satisfies proportionality.
Proof. Let ϕ be a prize allocation rule satisfying proportionality. Let (N,R, E) and (N,R, E ′)
be two competitions and let i ∈ N be a competitor. Then
ϕi(N,R, E + E
′) = (E + E ′)ϕi(N,R, 1)
= Eϕi(N,R, 1) + E
′ϕi(N,R, 1)
= ϕi(N,R, E) + ϕi(N,R, E
′).
Hence, ϕ satisfies endowment additivity.
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Now, let ϕ be a prize allocation rule satisfying endowment additivity. Then ϕ satisfies
endowment monotonicity. By Lemma 1, ϕ satisfies endowment continuity. Let (N,R, E) be
a competition and let i ∈ N be a competitor. If E is a rational number, then there exist two
natural numbers p ∈ N and q ∈ N such that E = p
q
. By endowment additivity,
ϕi(N,R, E) = ϕi(N,R,
p
q
)
= pϕi(N,R,
1
q
)
= p
q
qϕi(N,R,
1
q
)
= p
q
ϕi(N,R, 1)
= Eϕi(N,R, 1).
By endowment continuity, ϕi(N,R, E) = Eϕi(N,R, 1) for each real number E. Hence, ϕ
satisfies proportionality. 
Theorem 2
A prize allocation rule ϕ satisfies anonymity, order preservation, winner strict endowment
monotonicity, and local consistency iff there exists a continuous and non-decreasing function
f : R+ → R+ with 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ x for each x such that for each competition (N,R, E) and
each competitor i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(N,R, E) =

x if R(i) = 1;f (R(i)−1)(x) otherwise,
where x ∈ R+ is such that x+
∑|N |
k=2 f
(k−1)(x) = E.
Proof. It is readily checked that each such ϕ satisfies anonymity, order preservation, winner
strict endowment monotonicity, and local consistency.
Let ϕ be a prize allocation rule satisfying anonymity, order preservation, winner strict
endowment monotonicity, and local consistency. Then ϕ satisfies endowment monotonicity.
By Lemma 1, ϕ satisfies endowment continuity. Let N ⊆ U with |N | = 2 be a set of
two competitors and let R be the corresponding ranking. Denote N = {1, 2} such that
R(1) = 1 and R(2) = 2. For each x ∈ R+, define f(x) = y iff ϕ1(N,R, x + y) = x and
ϕ2(N,R, x + y) = y. By winner strict endowment monotonicity, endowment continuity,
and order preservation, f : R+ → R+ is a well-defined, continuous and non-decreasing
function with 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ x for each x. By anonymity, ϕ fits the description with f for each
competition with two competitors. Let ϕ′ be a prize allocation rule that fits the description
with f for each competition with arbitrary number of competitors.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a competition (N,R, E) such that
ϕ′(N,R, E) 6= ϕ(N,R, E). Denote N = {1, . . . , |N |} such that R(k) = k for each k ∈ N .
Let i ∈ N be such that ϕ′i(N,R, E) 6= ϕi(N,R, E) and ϕ
′
j(N,R, E) = ϕj(N,R, E) for each
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j ∈ N with j < i. Suppose without loss of generality that ϕ′i(N,R, E) > ϕi(N,R, E). By
local consistency and anonymity,
ϕ′i+1(N,R, E) = ϕ
′
i+1({i, i+ 1},R{i,i+1}, ϕ
′
i(N,R, E) + ϕ
′
i+1(N,R, E))
= f(ϕ′i(N,R, E))
≥ f(ϕi(N,R, E))
= ϕi+1({i, i+ 1},R{i,i+1}, ϕi(N,R, E) + ϕi+1(N,R, E))
= ϕi+1(N,R, E).
In a similar way, this implies that ϕ′i+2(N,R, E) ≥ ϕi+2(N,R, E). Continuing this reasoning,
ϕ′j(N,R, E) ≥ ϕj(N,R, E) for each j ∈ N with j > i. This means that∑
j∈N
ϕ′j(N,R, E) >
∑
j∈N
ϕj(N,R, E) = E.
This is a contradiction. Hence, ϕ′(N,R, E) = ϕ(N,R, E) for each competition (N,R, E).

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